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EQUAL PROTECTION
York State Constitution when no suspect class or fundamental




(printed April 4, 1994)
Respondent, Dean Mitchell, a surviving partner in a gay
relationship, alleged that his constitutional rights under the
United States257 and New York State258 Constitutions had been
violated, in that section 1001(1)(a) of the New York Surrogate's
Court Procedure Act [hereinafter SCPA]259 and section 4-1.1 of
the New York Estates, Powers and Trusts Law [hereinafter
EPTL], 260 precluded him from inheriting his partner's estate. 261
The court held that the respondent did not fall within the statutory
256. N.Y. L.J., Apr. 4, 1994, at 29 (Sur. Ct. New York County).
257. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1. The Federal Equal Protection Clause
provides in pertinent part: "No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." Id.
258. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11. Article 1, section 11 provides in pertinent
part: "No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state
or any subdivision thereof." Id.
259 N.Y. SURR. Cr. PROC. ACT § 1001(1)(a) (McKinney 1981 & Supp.
1994). Section 1001(1)(a) provides in pertinent part: "Letters of administration
must be granted to the persons who are distributees of an intestate and who are
eligible and qualify, in the following order: (a) the surviving spouse..." Id.
260. N.Y. EsT. POwERS & TRusTS LAW § 4-1.1 (McKinney 1981 & Supp.
1994). Section 4-1.1 provides in pertinent part:
The property of a decedent not disposed of by will shall be distributed
as provided in this section... (a) If a decedent is survived by: (1) A
spouse and issue, fifty thousand dollars and one-half of the residue to
the spouse, and the balance thereof to the issue by representation.
Id. (emphasis added).
261. Petri, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 4, 1994, at 29.
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definition of "spouse" therefore, his constitutional rights had not
been violated.2 62
The decedent, Gary A. Petri, died intestate and letters of
administration were granted to his father. 263 Although Mitchell
and Petri were of the same sex, Mitchell alleged that because he
and the decedent lived together for eleven years and held
themselves out to the public as a couple, he should be included
within the statutory meaning of "spouse." Mitchell concluded
that the letters of administration should be revoked and issued to
him.264
There being no direct authority on the issue, the court looked to
analogous precedent for help in deciding Mitchell's claim. In In
re Cooper,2 65 the Appellate Division, Second Department held
that a surviving partner of a homosexual relationship was not a
"surviving spouse" within the definition of the elective share
statute.266 The statute provided that a surviving spouse may elect




265. 187 A.D.2d 128, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797 (2d Dep't 1993). In Cooper, the
survivor in a homosexual relationship alleged that he had lived with the
decedent in a "spousal-type relationship" for approximately four years and that
the only reason they were not legally married was because New York does not
issue marriage licenses to persons of the same sex. Id. at 129-30, 592
N.Y.S.2d at 797-98.
266. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUsTS LAW § 5-1.1(c)(1)(B) (McKinney 1981
& Supp. 1994). Section 5-1.1(c)(1)(B) provides in pertinent part:
(c) Election by surviving spouse against wills executed and testamentary
provisions made after August thirty-first, nineteen hundred sixty-six...
(1) Where, after August thirty-first, nineteen hundred sixty-six, a
testator executes a will disposing of his entire estate, and is
survived by a spouse, a personal right of election is given to the
surviving spouse to take a share of the decedent's estate, subject to
the following: ... (B) The elective share ... is one-third of the
net estate if the decedent is survived by one or more issue and, in
all other cases, one-half of such net estate.
Id.
267. Cooper, 187 A.D.2d at 129, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 797.
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Rovira v. AT&T, 268 where a lesbian life partner and her children
were not considered "beneficiaries" entitled to benefits under a
death benefit plan.269
Respondent argued that the court should apply a "heightened or
strict scrutiny review in analyzing his claim because he had been
discriminated against due to his sexual orientation." 270
Respondent relied on Baehr v. Lewin,27 1 where the court held
that "sex-based classifications are subject, as a per se matter, to
some form of 'heightened' scrutiny, be it 'strict' or
'intermediate,' rather than a mere 'rational basis' analysis." 27 2
The administrator in Mitchell argued that the court should apply
the "rational basis test." 273 This test provides that legislation "'is
presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification
drawn... is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.'"274
The Surrogates Court, in the case at bar, however, held that
there was a compelling state interest in the Mitchell case which
would fulfill any level of scrutiny. 275 The court proclaimed that
the state has a compelling interest "in having its descent and
distribution scheme clear, simple, predictable and capable of
determining heirs at the moment of death." 276
268. 817 F. Supp. 1062 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). See In re Szabo, N.Y. L.J., July
16, 1990, at 31 (Sur. Ct. Westchester County 1990) (noting that homosexual
partners were denied a spousal right of election because the court defined a
spouse as a "person to whom one is married").
269. Rovira, 817 F. Supp. at 1071.
270. Petri, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 4, 1994 at 29.
271. 852 P.2d 44, 57 (Haw. 1993) (holding that the Hawaii Constitution
does not give rise to fundamental right of privacy for persons of the same sex
to marry).
272. Id. at 65.
273. Petri, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 4, 1994, at 29.
274. Cooper, 187 A.D.2d at 133, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 799-800 (quoting
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)).
275. Petri, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 4, 1994, at 29.
276. Id. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 771 (1977) (stating that
"[t]he orderly disposition of property at death requires an appropriate legal
framework, the structuring of which is a matter particularly within the
competence of the individual States"); In re Smith, 114 Misc. 2d 346, 349,
451 N.Y.S.2d 546, 548 (Surr. Ct. Queens County 1982) (stating that the
state's compelling interest is "to insure the orderly settlement of estates and
19951 913
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Because of the strong possibility of fraudulent claims, the State
abolished common law marriages earlier in the century. The
Foley Commission to Investigate Defects in the Law of Estates
found that "attempts to collect funds from decedents' estates were
a fruitful source of litigation," 277 and that "there was no built-in
method for distinguishing between valid and specious
claims.. . thus.., the doctrine-served the State poorly. '" 278
The Petri court held that a marriage license is needed to meet
the state's compelling interest in the avoidance of fraudulent
claims.27 9 Marriage certificates provide documentary proof
against fraudulent claims, which provides for security and
certainty of the finality of a case. 280
This need for security and certainty can also be seen in the fact
that unmarried couples must enter into express contracts for
personal services. In Robin v. Cook,281 the court held that "it
was beyond the court's authority to" define a "spousal-type"
relationship existed between two lesbian lovers who were seeking
spousal maintenance and a declaration of inheritance rights. 282
The Robin court reasoned that "the law does not permit two
individuals to declare themselves married and to thereby become
endowed with the statutory rights bestowed upon the parties to a
marriage legally solemnized.' 283
The court found that the above considerations apply to
homosexuals as well as heterosexuals and that Mitchell could not
dependability of titles to property passing under intestacy laws") (quoting In re
Lalli, 43 N.Y.2d 65, 69-70, 371 N.E.2d 481, 482-83, 400 N.Y.S.2d 761, 763
(1977)).
277. Morone v. Morone, 50 N.Y.2d 481, 489, 407 N.E.2d 438, 441, 429
N.Y.S.2d 592, 596 (1980) (refusing to "recognize an action based upon an
implied contract for personal services between unmarried persons living
together").
278. Id. Thirty years later, the Commission on the Modernization, Revision
and Simplification of the Law of Estates made similar findings. Petri, N.Y.
L.J., Apr. 4, 1994, at 29.
279. Petri, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 4, 1994, at 29.
280. Id.
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be placed in a better position than participants in a common law
marriage, which is in fact "no position at all." 284
There is no requirement in the Domestic Relations Law that
would disqualify same-sex couples from qualifying for marriage
licenses. The sole authority underlying New York's prohibition
against same-sex marriage can be found in two lower court
decisions.285 However, these cases do not address the
constitutional issues of the prohibition.
In Baker v. Nelson,286 the Minnesota Supreme Court held that
a statute governing marriage does not authorize marriage between
persons of the same sex. 2 87 This statute was held to be
constitutional. The court referred to marriage as a term of
"common usage, meaning the state of union between persons of
the opposite sex," 288 and further stated that it would be
"unrealistic" to believe that the draftsmen of the statute would
have meant anything different.28 9 "The institution of marriage as
a union of man and woman... is as old as the book of
Genesis." 2 90 An appeal was taken to the United States Supreme
Court. It was dismissed, however, for want of a substantial
284. Petri, N.Y. L.., Apr. 4, 1994, at 29.
285. See Frances B. v. Mark B., 78 Misc. 2d 112, 117-18, 355 N.Y.S.2d
712, 716-17 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1974) (finding that there was never a
valid marriage where defendant fraudulently represented that the defendant was
a male person capable to marry a female person when, in fact, defendant was a
female person); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 67 Misc. 2d 982, 985, 325
N.Y.S.2d 499, 501 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1971) (finding that there was no
valid marriage where the male plaintiff went through a marriage ceremony
with the defendant, believing that the defendant was female but, in fact, was
male).
286. 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971). In Baker, a gay couple was denied a
marriage license. The couple argued that the prohibition of same-sex marriages
violated the Ninth Amendment of the Constitution and that they were
"deprived of liberty and property without due process and are denied the equal
protection of the lavs... guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at
186.
287. Id. at 185.
288. Id. at 185-86.
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federal question.29 1 "Such a dismissal is a holding that the
constitutional challenge was considered and rejected." 292
The reasoning in Baker was followed by the court in Singer v.
Hara,2 93 where prohibition of same-sex marriages was found not
to violate the Equal Protection Clause because "marriage is so
clearly related to the public interest in affording a favorable
environment for the growth of children." In addition, there is a
"rational basis upon which the state may limit the protection of
its marriage laws to the legal union of one man and one
woman. ,294
Rational basis scrutiny has also been applied in cases where
equal protection challenges have been advanced, under the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 295 to classifications
based upon sexual preference. In Bowers v. Hardwick,2 96 the
Supreme Court ruled that homosexual activity is not a
fundamental right protected by substantive due process.
Therefore, the proper standard of review under the Fifth
Amendment was the rational basis review.2 97
In High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance
Office, 29 8 the court applied the rational basis standard and
rejected an equal protection challenge to a Department of Defense
291. See In re Cooper, 187 A.D.2d 128, 134, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797, 800 (2d
Dep't 1993) (citing Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972)).
292. Id. at 134, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 800 (citing In re Cooper, 149 Misc. 2d
282, 284, 564 N.Y.S.2d 684, 686 (Surr. Ct. Kings County 1990)).
293. 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. 1974) (holding that the constitutional rights of
a gay couple were not violated when the state denied them a marriage license).
294. Id. at 1197. But see Baehr v, Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 65 (Haw. 1993)
(holding that a statute that restricts marital relations to males or females
establishes "sex-based classifications" which are subject to "strict scrutiny"
test in an equal protection challenge).
295. The United States Supreme Court has held that "[wihile the Fifth
Amendment contains no equal protection clause, it does forbid discrimination
that is so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process." Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1974) (citations omitted).
296. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
297. Id. at 194-96.
298. 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990). In High Tech Gays, the court held that
"the [lower] court erred in applying heightened scrutiny to the regulations at
issue and that the proper standard [wa]s rational basis review." Id. at 571.
916 [V/ol 11
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policy of mandatory investigations into the backgrounds of all
gay and lesbian applicants for secret and top secret security
clearance. 299 The court held that "homosexuals do not constitute
a suspect or quasi-suspect class entitled to greater than rational
basis scrutiny," 300 because, although homosexuals have a history
of discrimination, homosexuality is not an immutable
characteristic. Homosexuality is behavioral and, therefore, is
"fundamentally different from traits such as race, gender, or
alienage, which define already existing suspect and quasi-suspect
classes. " 3 0 1
In addition, in Adams v. Howerton,302 the court held that a
citizen's "spouse," within the meaning of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, must be an individual of the opposite sex.
Applying rational basis scrutiny, a bar against an alleged
homosexual "spouse" was not unconstitutional. 303
Although the Petri court found that a marriage license would be
needed to recognize a "spouse" under SCPA section 1001 and
EPTL section 4-1.1, which is justified by the state's compelling
interest, "in the orderliness of transfer of property rights on
death," 304 the opinion was skeptical of the practice of denying
marriage licenses to gay couples. 305 The court stated that "[Ut is
questionable whether, in this era of domestic partnerships and
alternative lifestyle education in grammar schools, it can still be
299. Id. at 565.
300. Id. at 574.
301. Id. at 573.
302. 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111 (1982). The
Adams court held that conferring spousal status only to heterosexual marriage
comports with the Due Process Clause and its equal protection requirements.
Id. at 1042.
303. Id. at 1043.
304. Petri, N.Y. L.J., April 4, 1994, at 29.
305. Id. The court states that "the assumption that same sex marriages are
prohibited in New York is premature." Id. See Genesis of Mt. Vernon v.
Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Mt. Vernon, 81 N.Y.2d 741, 745, 609 N.E.2d 122,
125, 593 N.Y.S.2d 769, 772 (1992) (holding that "it was premature for [the]
Supreme Court to address the constitutionality of the Zoning Ordinance's
definition of 'family'") (citations omitted).
19951 917
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said that marriage has one universal meaning which does not
include couples of the same sex." 306
The New York Court of Appeals has held that same-sex
partners were "family members" for purposes of rent control
regulations prohibiting certain evictions. 307 However, the
appellate division subsequently held that a lesbian partner was not
a "parent" under the Domestic Relations Law. 308 The New York
Court of Appeals subsequently affirmed this decision. 309
Although the Alison holding had been limited to a visitation
context, it indicated that the New York state courts are still
hesitant to broaden the term "surviving spouse" to include
homosexual life partners when applying EPTL section 5-1.1.310
Under both state and federal analysis, a rational basis test was
applied. The decision in the case at bar, therefore, was "justified
on the basis of the compelling state interest in the orderliness of
transfer of property rights on death" which clearly meets the
requirements of the rational basis test. 311 In conclusion, the
respondent's equal protection rights under both the State312 and
Federal313 Constitutions were not violated when a surviving
homosexual partner was precluded from inheriting the estate of
his deceased companion who died intestate.
306. Petri, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 4, 1994, at 29.
307. See Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 74 N.Y.2d 201, 211, 543 N.E.2d
49, 54, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784, 789 (1989) (concluding that "in using the term
'family' the legislature intended to extend protection to those who reside in
households having all of the normal familial characteristics").
308. Matter of Alison D. v. Virginia M., 155 A.D.2d 11, 13, 552
N.Y.S.2d 321, 322 (2d Dep't 1990), aff'd, 77 N.Y.2d 651, 572 N.E.2d 27,
569 N.Y.S.2d 586 (1991) (limiting the definition of "parent" to biological
parent concluding that a woman who had been a "live-in lover" with the
child's mother was not entitled to visitation rights).
309. Matter of Alison D. v. Virginia M., 77 N.Y.2d 651, 572 N.E.2d 27,
569 N.Y.S.2d 586 (1991).
310. See In re Cooper, 187 A.D.2d 128, 132, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797, 799 (2d
Dep't 1993) (refusing to extend the holding in Braschi to be interpreted as
including homosexual life partners as "surviving spouses").
311. Petri, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 4, 1994, at 29.
312. N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 11.
313. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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